Buyers typically do not read the …ne print in contracts, providing an incentive for a monopolist to draft terms which are unfavorable to buyers. We model this problem, proving that trade must then be ine¢cient. We show that regulation which mandates e¢cient terms raises welfare. More interestingly, regulations which prohibit the least e¢cient terms may reduce welfare by inducing the monopolist not to o¤er favorable terms. We extend these results to markets in which some buyers are naive, showing that prohibiting the least e¢cient terms may also harm the naive buyers.
Introduction
According to some estimates, over 99% of commercial contracts are standard form: one party drafts a contract which the other party can only accept or reject (cf. Zamir (2014) ). Standard form contracts are often complex, and are written in …ne print or jargon; so buyers rarely read their non-price terms. Drafters of contracts may therefore have an incentive to include terms which exploit buyers and, potentially, result in ine¢cient trade. Accordingly, economists and contract lawyers have long advocated regulation of the terms in complex contracts by treating some terms as unenforceable. This paper explores the e¤ect of such policies in a model where complexity is endogenous, and unregulated trade is indeed ine¢cient. In our main model, an unregulated monopolist drafts a contract (for trade in a good), which might be either simple or complex. A simple contract speci…es a price for the good, which buyers observe, and default terms (such as warranty coverage) which are commonly known, perhaps because they describe conventional commercial practice. In particular, simple contracts do not contain any …ne print. On the other hand, the monopolist can only change these default terms by drafting a complex contract. Speci…cally, a complex contract speci…es a price for the good -which buyers observe -and non-price terms, which buyers can read at a (socially wasteful) cost. In other words, non-price terms are written in …ne print. These terms may be more favorable or less favorable for buyers than default terms. The monopolist has the opposite incentives: it is cheaper to produce, the less favorable are terms. We assume that it is socially e¢cient for trade to occur in (complex) contracts which include terms which are more favorable to buyers than default terms: so complex contracts, with requisite …ne print, may play a socially valuable role. Buyers observe whether the contract on o¤er is simple or complex (e.g. via its length). In the former case, they decide whether to accept or to reject; in the latter case, they may also choose to read before accepting or rejecting.
Trade with an unregulated monopolist must then be ine¢cient in every Bayes perfect equilibrium (henceforth BPE) because the monopolist cannot commit to drafting favorable terms. As a result, welfare is reduced for two reasons: buyers would only read a complex contract if the monopolist mixed over terms, sometimes o¤ering contracts which contain unfavorable terms; and the monopolist would only o¤er a favorable contract if buyers sometimes read complex contracts.
This game has many BPEs because buyers may infer that any complex contract which is not o¤ered on the path of a putative BPE contains unfavorable terms. These inferences seem unduly adverse; so we introduce a re…nement which selects the BPE with the highest expected pro…t. This BPE takes one out of two possible forms. If reading is costly enough then the monopolist o¤ers either a simple or an unfavorable contract; otherwise, she mixes between o¤ering a favorable and an unfavorable contract (at the same price), while buyers mix between reading the contract and accepting without reading, earning their reservation value. These predictions are consistent with evidence that buyers rarely read (cf. Bakos et al (2014) ), and that terms in complex contracts are not uniformly unfavorable (cf. Mann and Siebeneicher (2008) and Marotta-Wurgler (2008) ). Furthermore, our ine¢ciency result provides a reason why policy makers might intervene in unregulated markets.
We consider the e¤ects of two sorts of regulation: mandating favorable terms (henceforth mandating regulation) and prohibiting unfavorable terms (henceforth mitigating regulation). Trade under mandating regulation is e¢cient; and the outcome Pareto-dominates that in unregulated markets, all gains accruing to the monopolist. The intuition is that this regulation solves the monopolist's commitment problem: buyers know that complex contracts must be favorable; so the monopolist can raise price to buyers' (common) reservation value.
While mandating favorable terms would ensure e¢ciency, identifying e¢cient terms may be beyond the capacity of regulators -which is arguably why mitigating regulation is more common. Mitigating regulation prevents the monopolist drafting some ine¢cient terms; so it is surprising that such regulation may reduce welfare when an unregulated monopolist sometimes o¤ers a favorable contract. The intuition is that such regulations modify rather than eliminate the monopolist's commitment problem. Consequently, the monopolist can still only o¤er complex contracts if buyers are prepared to read; and prohibiting unfavorable terms reduces buyers' incentives to read by lowering the utility di¤erence between the best and worst possible terms. Mitigating regulation may therefore reduce welfare by inducing the monopolist not to o¤er any favorable contracts.
Following the literature, we extend our main model by introducing some naive buyers, dubbing the other buyers as sophisticated. In light of the heterogeneity of buyers, we also suppose that the monopolist can o¤er a menu of contracts (though she cannot tell which buyer is naive).
We follow the literature by supposing that naive buyers are overoptimistic: they believe that every complex contract contains favorable terms, and therefore never read. We focus on cases where few enough buyers are naive (among other conditions). If reading is cheap enough and few enough buyers are naive then an unregulated monopolist o¤ers complex contracts at two prices. The higher priced contract is favorable with positive probability and otherwise unfavorable, and is only accepted by sophisticated buyers; the cheaper contract is always unfavorable, and is accepted by naive buyers, who wrongly believe it to be favorable. The monopolist thereby discriminates between buyers, trading an unfavorable contract with naive buyers. Naive and sophisticated buyers separate, but both trade a complex contract; so the monopolist cannot charge naive buyers more than sophisticated buyers for a complex contract. Sophisticated buyers therefore protect naive buyers, even though the monopolist o¤ers a menu of contracts. Mandating regulation again raises welfare, and now strictly bene…ts naive buyers as well as the monopolist. By contrast, mitigating regulation may harm naive buyers by reducing the monopolist's incentive to o¤er favorable contracts to sophisticated buyers (for the same reasons as in our main model), and may therefore eliminate the protection which they provide naive buyers in unregulated markets.
Related literature
The issues which we address are related to the large literature on quality competition with sophisticated buyers. More directly, various papers incorporate a cost of reading terms which are drafted by one of the parties to the contract.
1 In Katz (1990) , there is an interval of feasible non-price terms, which depends on the legal regime, but no simple contract. (Simple contracts do not appear in the other papers discussed below.) A monopolist chooses a directly observable price and non-price terms which can be read at a cost, as in our model. Divisibility of all terms implies that the monopolist never mixes; she o¤ers the most unfavorable terms that the legal regime allows, setting price such that a buyer who reads is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting. This outcome is also possible in our model if unfavorable contracts yield a greater social surplus than simple contracts and reading is costly enough; but it is inconsistent with evidence that …ne print terms are typically not as unfavorable as possible. If reading is not too costly then our model (with a …nite number of feasible non-price terms) predicts that the monopolist would o¤er a favorable contract with positive probability, setting price such that buyers are indi¤erent between reading, accepting without reading, and rejecting. Katz shows that mandating regulation induces an e¢cient outcome, as in our model. However, smaller improvements in the most unfavorable possible terms raises welfare in his model, whereas mitigating regulation may reduce welfare in our model.
There is a …nite number of possible terms in Rasmusen's (2001) two-player model, so the non-drafting party mixes between accepting and reading any complex contract, as in our model. Rasmusen assumes that it is costly to read every clause, so price cannot signal non-price terms. This feature plays an important role in our characterization of equilibria.
In Che and Choi (2009) , competitive sellers can incur a cost to partially disclose whether terms are favorable or unfavorable; and buyers, who directly observe price, can either 1 Hermalin et al's (2007) survey of the law and economics of contracts discusses these and related issues. accept or read (at a cost), and can resample sellers if they reject. In any equilibrium, as in our model, buyers who read are indi¤erent between accepting and reading. Furthermore, sellers separate into those o¤ering favorable terms with high probability and not disclosing, and those who are sure to o¤er unfavorable terms and disclose.
There is typically a range of BPEs in Che and Choi, as in our model. Che and Choi select the BPE which maximizes welfare rather than pro…t. Nevertheless, the two criteria select the same BPE in our main model because our re…nement implies that buyers earn their reservation value.
In contrast to Che and Choi, we do not allow the monopolist to disclose non-price terms. However, if mandatory disclosure were possible in our model then a regulated monopolist would o¤er a favorable contract, priced at the reservation value; and regulated trade would be e¢cient. This is not true in Che and Choi because they assume that sellers must o¤er a single contract to buyers with heterogeneous valuations. This paper, like Katz (1990) , Che and Choi (2009) and Rasmusen (2001) , is related to the literature on auditing/inspection games, as surveyed by Avenhaus et al (2002) and Avenhaus and Canty (2009) . Our results on unregulated trade reproduce a fundamental property of inspection games with a …nite number of feasible terms: favorable contracts can only be o¤ered in equilibrium if buyers and seller(s) monitor each other by mixing: sometimes o¤ering unfavorable contracts and sometimes reading.
The papers hitherto surveyed assume that all buyers are sophisticated, as in our main model. A related literature, starting with Gabaix and Laibson (2006) , considers competitive markets in which some buyers are naively optimistic. 2 Gabaix and Laibson assume that all buyers acquire a base product from a seller after observing her price, and may either acquire an add-on or (ine¢ciently) incur a substitution cost. Sellers can choose any scalar price for the base product and for the add-on, and whether to o¤er a shrouded or an unshrouded contract. The literature focuses on this decision; we preclude such a decision by supposing that the complexity of a given contract is determined by its content (viz. whether it amends default terms).
Conditional on sellers choosing to shroud, the models share several important features, but di¤er in other respects. First, the opportunity to substitute away allows buyers to avoid unfavorable add-on terms, like our reading cost; though in Gabaix and Laibson, buyers can accept the base product alone, whereas buyers in our model can only avoid an unfavorable contract by rejecting. Conditional on sellers choosing to shroud, trade would be ine¢cient in Gabaix and Laibson for reasons akin to the ine¢ciency in our model and in Katz (1990) : sellers would choose the most unfavorable price for the add-on, inducing sophisticated buyers to substitute away. Second, Gabaix and Laibson allow buyers to be sophisticated (in our sense) or to believe that the add-on is free (as in our model with naive buyers). Sellers compete by cutting the base product price; so exploitation of naive buyers bene…ts sophisticated buyers. This form of cross-subsidization is impossible in our model because the monopolist uses her menu to screen buyers in equilibrium. Indeed, sophisticated buyers protect (few enough) naive buyers in our model. This form of protection is also absent in Schwartz and Wilde's (1983) price search model, where sellers must o¤er the same terms to all buyers. Heidhues et al (2014) Section 4.2 builds on Gabaix and Laibson (2006) by assuming that sellers o¤er a menu of products (rather than of contracts), each bundling the base product and the add-on. 3 Heidhues et al show that trade is e¢cient if enough buyers are sophisticated (contrary to our results), and that sellers use the menu to separate buyers, as in our model. In equilibrium, naive buyers are not protected because they recognize that sophisticated buyers acquire a di¤erent product; 4 whereas, protection occurs in our model because naive buyers believe that the complex contracts on o¤er contain the same terms. Heidhues et al also show that reducing the maximal feasible price of the add-on increases welfare (as in Katz (1990) ); whereas, mitigating regulation may reduce welfare in our model.
Our results are related to the literature on regulation, particularly to the study of what Armstrong and Sappington (2007) call "practical regulatory policies": the comparison of simple regulatory policies, such as price caps and disclosure.
5 Imposing price caps on overdrafts in Armstrong and Vickers (2012) plays a similar role to regulations in our model. Stringent enough price caps are equivalent to mandating favorable terms in our model, and must raise welfare. Armstrong and Vickers note that the welfare e¤ect of less stringent caps is ambiguous. However, this ambiguity turns on whether naive and sophisticated buyers cross-subsidize each other; whereas mitigating regulation could raise or lower welfare in our model when all buyers are sophisticated. Our result is also reminiscent of Armstrong et al's (2009) price search model: imposing a price cap reduces buyers' incentive to become informed (read) in competitive markets, and might therefore make all buyers worse o¤. More generally, our results on mitigating regulation have a second best ‡avor: moving regulations part way to the ideal rule may be worse than no regulation because agents' equilibrium response induces a convex relation between regulatory policy and welfare.
We present our model of unregulated monopoly in Section 2, characterizing trade in unregulated and regulated markets in Section 3. We extend our analysis to markets in which some buyers are naive in Section 4, and summarize in Section 5. Longer proofs are in an Appendix; we detail some arguments used in Section 4 in an online appendix: D'Agostino and Seidmann (2016).
Unregulated trade
In this section, we de…ne a game representing play in an unregulated monopoly.
The game is played by a monopolist (she) and a unit mass of buyers (he). Players can trade a good which is indivisible in consumption. The monopolist o¤ers a contract; each 3 Sophisticated buyers observe both prices, unlike our model and Gabaix and Laibson (2006) . 4 This property holds in a number of related models in which sellers o¤er a menu of products: Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) [resp. (2008) ] demonstrate that a monopolist's optimal menu induces time-inconsistent [resp. over-optimistic] and sophisticated buyers to separate: the former are not protected by the latter in equilibrium; Heidhues and Koszegi (2010) buyer then decides whether to accept, to reject or to read before accepting or rejecting. The game then ends.
We now describe the game in detail: Contracts Contracts determine both the price at which trade takes place and some other (nonprice) terms of trade. We suppose that a contract is either simple or complex. A simple contract contains a single clause, which speci…es the price charged (denoted ), but leaves non-price terms unspeci…ed. We suppose that trade is then governed by default terms, which are commonly known by all players. Default terms might be those which courts enforce, absent amendment. They might also represent common commercial practice, which triggers reasonable expectations by buyers.
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A complex contract contains two clauses: the …rst clause speci…es the price charged; the second clause speci…es non-price terms, which might either be favorable, unfavorable or default. (Default terms repeat those implicit in a simple contract.) We will refer to complex contracts with favorable, default and unfavorable terms as favorable, default and unfavorable contracts, respectively.
Non-price terms might specify, for example, the extent of a warranty, delivery costs, the number of permissible users, the availability of class relief, or a dispute resolution procedure. In each case, all buyers share the same ranking over terms. Our distinction between simple and complex contracts implies that the monopolist can only propose a non-default term by o¤ering a complex contract. We view this property as a key feature of …ne print models. It will play a crucial role in our analysis.
Some notation will prove useful: we write f  g, f g and f g respectively for favorable, default and unfavorable contracts, each priced at . We write  for f  g: the set of possible terms.
Buyers We model the problem of complexity by supposing that buyers observe both the …rst clause of each contract on o¤er (the price) and whether it is simple or complex, but not the content of any second clause. If the contract is simple then the buyer, knowing its (default) terms, either accepts or rejects. If the contract is complex then the buyer can either accept the contract without reading, reject the o¤er without reading, or read the second clause and then decide whether to accept or reject.
A buyer receives a return of 0 if he does not consume, and of   ¡  if he buys a good priced at  with terms  2  . We also assume that a buyer incurs a sunk cost, denoted by   0, if he decides to read the second clause of a complex contract. This cost could represent the time taken to read a lengthy document or be incurred by hiring an expert to interpret jargon. A buyer's payo¤ is his return minus any reading cost incurred.
Monopolist The monopolist starts the game by deciding which contract to o¤er, where price  can take any scalar value.
If a buyer accepts a contract then the monopolist receives a revenue equal to the contractual price, and incurs a constant production cost, plus a drafting cost if her contract is complex. The drafting cost is positive, but less than   ¡   . We write   [resp.   ] for the total cost incurred when a favorable [rep. unfavorable] contract is accepted. It is notationally convenient to write   for the (production) cost incurred when a simple contract is accepted. As default contracts are complex, trading them costs   plus the drafting cost. We will subsequently argue that an unregulated monopolist never o¤ers a default contract (because of the drafting cost). The monopolist earns 0 when a buyer does not accept. Her payo¤ is the integral of the pro…t which she earns across all buyers.
Game We denote the game described above by , and refer to it as the unregulated game. We will focus on games in which the various parameters are generic. This restriction primarily excludes cases in which
Equilibria
We will analyze  by characterizing a subset of its Bayes-perfect equilibria, where a buyer's belief assigns a probability distribution over the terms in a complex contract priced at : for every  2 <.
9 We denote the associated strategy combination and buyer beliefs as a BPE, describing a BPE in which the monopolist o¤ers a simple [resp. complex] contract for sure as a simple [resp. complex ] BPE. We will refer to the payo¤ vector in a BPE as a BPE outcome.
One might intuitively expect that the monopolist would be able to exert market power because she alone can draft contracts. However, this is not true of all BPEs. Roughly speaking, the monopolist may be deterred from charging higher prices for a complex contract in some BPEs because buyers believe that terms are then unfavorable. These BPEs arguably rely on buyers threatening to hold implausible beliefs about the terms in complex contracts which are not o¤ered on the BPE path.
We explore the intuition that the monopolist's ideal BPE is played, using a re…nement in the spirit of Fudenberg and Levine (1989) . 10 It is expositionally convenient to provide a formal de…nition of the re…nement here, and to defer a more detailed explanation to a Remark at the end of Section 3.1 (following our main use of the re…nement in Proposition 3.1).
For any game , we de…ne a class of perturbed games ( ) in which the monopolist is an -commitment type with probability   0 and a normal type otherwise. Normal types have the same preferences as the monopolist in ; an -commitment type's play is de…ned in terms of the supremum of monopoly payo¤s across BPEs of , say  ¤ . If  has a BPE in which the monopolist earns  ¤ ¡  for some   0 then an -commitment type in ( ) plays her (possibly mixed) strategy in some such BPE; otherwise, the -commitment type in ( ) plays the monopolist's strategy in a BPE of  where she earns  ¤ . Given this de…nition, we can characterize the BPEs of any perturbed game ( ), denoting the (mixed) strategy played by buyers and the normal type of the monopolist in a BPE of ( ) by ( ). We say that beliefs plus a strategy combination  in  are an -equilibrium of  if they are a BPE of  and if some sequence of perturbed games f( )g have BPEs with strategy combinations f( )g which converge to  as  ! 0. We say that  is an equilibrium strategy combination of  if it is the limit of some sequence of -equilibrium strategy combinations of  as  converges to 0. An outcome is the payo¤ vector at some equilibrium of .
On one interpretation, our use of the re…nement means that our model implicitly represents play in a repeated game. The monopolist then has market power because she is a long-run player. This interpretation is arguably appropriate when modelling …ne print problems (cf. Bebchuk and Posner (2006) ). However, we prefer to view the re…nement as a way to preclude implausible beliefs, even if play is not repeated.
E¢ciency We will characterize equilibria of unregulated games which satisfy two assumptions on the bene…ts and costs of alternative terms. The …rst assumption states that buyers and sellers have con ‡icting interests over possible non-price terms:
A1: Con ‡icting interests
A1 seems natural in the context of our examples above of non-price terms. The second assumption imposes conditions on how the social surplus from trade varies with the terms:
A2: E¢cient favorable terms
We will refer to aggregate payo¤ (across the monopolist and buyers) as welfare. A2 implies that welfare is maximized when the monopolist trades favorable contracts with buyers who do not read.
A2 is, of course, empirically restrictive. We will return to the role that it plays in our analysis after Proposition 3.1 in Section 3.1.
We will henceforth normalize bene…ts and costs by setting   = 0 (so   could be negative).
We will refer to arg 6 = max   ¡   as the second best terms, and a contract which only contains the second best terms as a second best contract. (If default terms are second best then the second best contract is simple.) We will use subscript 2 to denote the bene…t and cost of second best terms.
Results
In Section 3.1, we characterize equilibrium play in unregulated games. In Section 3.2, we de…ne games in which the monopolist is regulated, characterize their equilibria, and compare outcomes with those in the unregulated game.
Unregulated games
Our …rst result provides grounds for considering regulation:
Lemma 1 Trade is ine¢cient in every BPE.
Proof E¢ciency requires all trade to be in favorable contracts (cf. A2), and for no buyer to read. If the monopolist anticipated that a buyer would accept a favorable contract (without reading) then the monopolist could pro…tably deviate to o¤ering an unfavorable contract at the same price. Consequently, every BPE is ine¢cient.¥ Drafters know the terms in complex contracts; whereas buyers must incur a socially wasteful cost to observe them directly. Lemma 1 asserts that this asymmetry of information must result in ine¢cient trade. We will explain this ine¢ciency in terms of commitment after Proposition 3.1 below.
Our next result describes necessary conditions for the monopolist to o¤er a favorable contract in a BPE:
Lemma 2 a The monopolist does not o¤er a (complex) default contract in any BPE.
b Any BPE in which the monopolist o¤ers a favorable contract with positive probability has the following properties: the monopolist also o¤ers an unfavorable contract at the same price as the favorable contract with positive probability; and buyers mix between accepting and reading a complex contract at that price, only accepting after reading favorable terms in the latter case.
In light of Lemma 2, we will henceforth refer to any BPEs in which the monopolist o¤ers favorable contracts as semi-favorable.
We prove Lemma 2 in the Appendix. The argument for part a is that buyers must sometimes read, else the monopolist could pro…tably deviate to o¤ering an unfavorable contract; and that buyers would only read if the monopolist sometimes o¤ered a complex contract which was not favorable at the same price. Such a contract could not be default because the monopolist could then pro…tably deviate to o¤ering a simple contract.
We will need some notation before stating our next result, which characterizes equilibria. We de…ne  as
. It is easy to con…rm that b     whenever  is well-de…ned.
Proposition 3.1 (Unregulated games)
Generic unregulated games have a unique equilibrium outcome, which is ine¢cient, and at which buyers expect to earn 0. The monopolist mixes between o¤ering an unfavorable and a favorable contract, each priced at b , if and only if    4 and
The monopolist otherwise o¤ers a second best contract, priced at  2 .
We prove Proposition 3.1 in the Appendix. Lemma 1 immediately implies that every equilibrium must be ine¢cient. The remainder of the proof uses the following steps. We …rst demonstrate that a second best BPE in which the monopolist charges  2 always exists, and that any other BPE is semi-favorable. We then prove that a semi-favorable BPE in which the monopolist charges b  exists if and only if the conditions in the premise hold: in other words, that the monopolist and buyers mutually discipline each other (cf. Lemma 2a).    4 ensures that buyers sometimes read: the left-hand side should be read as the utility di¤erence between accepting favorable and unfavorable contracts. The two conditions in (1) ensure that the monopolist cannot pro…tably deviate to o¤ering a second best contract: the …rst condition bounds above the pro…t from such a contract ( 2 ¡  2 ); the second condition bounds the BPE pro…t (b  ¡   ) below because b  is an increasing function of   . We also note that    4 and (1) are necessary for any semi-favorable BPE to exist, and that the monopolist then earns most (across BPEs) when she charges b  for a complex contract.
We end the proof by showing that the game has a unique equilibrium outcome. If    4 and (1) then every semi-favorable BPE in which the monopolist charges b  is an equilibrium; and no other BPE survives the re…nement because the monopolist could pro…tably deviate to o¤ering complex contracts priced just below b  in perturbed games. In particular, our re…nement captures the intuition that semi-favorable BPEs at prices below b  rely on implausible buyer inferences. On the other hand, every BPE is second best if the conditions in the premise fail; so the unique outcome is second best.
The price charged in a semi-favorable equilibrium approaches   as  ! 0 (by l'Hopital's rule); and the probability that terms are then favorable (viz.
when  is small enough. Proposition 3.1 therefore implies that the monopolist must o¤er complex contracts, which are almost sure to be favorable, at a price close to   when reading is almost costless. This property seems natural: for if reading were costless then the monopolist would o¤er a favorable contract, priced at   , in equilibrium.
This argument seems to underlie the claim that a monopolist would raise price rather than include unfavorable terms (cf. Rako¤ (1983) and Baird (2000) ): so trade in unregulated markets is e¢cient. This argument does not hold in our model, where reading is costly. Buyers must then ine¢ciently read in any semi-favorable equilibrium because the monopolist cannot commit to o¤ering favorable contracts. Viewed in this light, the Baird-Rako¤ argument implicitly supposes that a monopolist who charges more can commit to favorable terms. In the next subsection, we will explain how appropriately designed regulation eliminates the commitment problem and ensures e¢ciency.
Proposition 3.1 is consistent with the evidence that terms are typically not unfavorable (cf. Mann and Siebeneicher (2008) and Marotta-Wurgler (2008) ), and that buyers rarely read standard form contracts (cf. Bakos et al (2014) ). The probability that complex contracts are favorable equals (1 +
; while buyers read a complex contract with Remark (Re…nement) Our re…nement di¤ers from that introduced by Fudenberg and Levine (1989) via our de…nition of an -commitment type. They consider perturbed games in which some player is a normal or a commitment type. The normal type has the same preferences as that player in the original game; the commitment type always chooses the player's stage Stackelberg pure strategy. Fudenberg and Levine select a BPE of the original game which is the limit of BPEs of perturbed games as the prior probability that the player is normal approaches 1.
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In our model, the monopolist's Stackelberg strategy is to o¤er a favorable contract priced at   . The normal type would not pool with such a commitment type in any BPE of a perturbed game because buyers would have to accept, and the normal type could then pro…tably deviate to o¤ering an unfavorable contract at price   . In other words, the ensuing re…nement would have no power. Furthermore, introducing a commitment type who is sure to play the mixed strategy in the best complex BPE for the monopolist would not exclude second best BPEs because buyers could not improve on rejecting the commitment type's o¤er. Our re…nement has power because an -commitment type o¤ers a contract which buyers strictly prefer over rejecting.
Our re…nement selects the BPE which maximizes welfare across BPEs because buyers expect to earn 0 in every BPE and because pro…t in a semi-favorable BPE increases with price, and exceeds pro…t in the second best BPE. The intuition is that a monopolist who charges a higher price is more likely to o¤er a favorable contract, and that buyers are consequently more likely to accept, thereby economizing on socially wasteful reading.
Regulated markets
Proposition 3.1 provides a possible reason why trade in standard form contracts might be regulated: that unregulated trade is ine¢cient because one-sided drafting creates an informational asymmetry. Speci…cally, if buyers observed contract terms (or reading were costless) then the monopolist would o¤er a favorable contract, and trade would be e¢cient. Ine¢ciency might therefore be avoided by mandating disclosure. Unfortunately, forcing sellers to display unfavorable terms does not translate into informing buyers, particularly in settings where …ne print is an issue: that is, reading any disclosure is costly. Recent evidence casts doubt on the e¢cacy of mandatory disclosure in such settings.
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The natural alternative to disclosure rules is regulation which renders some possible terms unenforceable. Despite the general principle that parties are free to negotiate contracts, courts, legislatures and regulators have sometimes over-ruled unfavorable terms in standard form contracts. Eisenberg (2009) traces court activism to the 1960s -particularly to §2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which allowed courts to declare unconscionable terms unenforceable. This section was widely incorporated into state law, and was reformulated in §208 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
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In this subsection, we will use Proposition 3.1 to consider the welfare e¤ects of regulations which mandate favorable terms or prohibit unfavorable terms, but do not address (upfront = …rst clause) prices.
14 We will focus on the ex ante e¤ects of regulation: that is, how regulations (or precedents) change the contracts which a monopolist o¤ers. By contrast, fact-…nding courts resolve ex post disputes: viz. conditional on an existing agreement. As we note below, this distinction only matters in our model when we consider regulations which prohibit unfavorable terms.
Mandating regulation
We start by considering the e¤ects of regulations which mandate favorable terms but allow the monopolist to choose her price. We will refer to such a policy as mandating regulation, and the associated game as a mandating regulation game. The di¤erence between these games and those presented in Section 2 is that the monopolist is constrained to o¤er a favorable contract. 15 We will use the same solution concept (equilibrium) to characterize play under mandating regulation:
Lemma 3 If favorable terms are mandated then the monopolist charges   and earns   ¡   , whereas buyers earn 0. Trade is then e¢cient.
We can now use Proposition 3.1 and Lemma 3 to characterize the welfare e¤ects of mandating favorable terms, again omitting the obvious proof: Proposition 3.2 (Mandating regulation raises welfare) The outcome in mandating regulation games Pareto dominates the outcome in unregulated games.
Every equilibrium outcome in an unregulated market is ine¢cient because buyers must sometimes read for sellers to o¤er favorable contracts; and the monopolist must sometimes o¤er unfavorable contracts to ensure that buyers read. Mandating favorable terms directly disciplines the monopolist, allowing buyers to accept complex contracts without reading.
12 Ben-Shahar and Schneider (2014) and Ayres and Schwartz (2014) discuss this evidence. 13 In the UK, the 2014 Consumer Rights Act deems …ne print terms unfair if they violate good faith requirements and are detrimental enough to buyers.
14 Courts could …nd price unconscionable, but have been very reluctant to do so (cf. White and Summers (2010) §5-5 and 5-7). Paragraph 5.1 of the UK Consumer Rights Act exempts upfront prices from considerations of fairness.
15 A2 implies that the same results apply to regulations which require that any complex contract be favorable, but allow the monopolist to o¤er simple contracts.
While mandating regulation raises ex ante welfare, the monopoly is the sole bene…ciary because buyers expect to earn 0 in both cases. This property is quite striking because the case for regulation in the related literature and court decisions has been that it protects buyers. Proposition 3.2 explains why a regulator (with an ex ante perspective) would mandate favorable terms. The same policy is optimal for courts: A2 implies that replacing unfavorable or default terms in accepted contracts also raises welfare.
Mitigating regulation
We now turn to regulations which mitigate terms solely by prohibiting unfavorable contracts or making unfavorable terms unenforceable. We will refer to these as mitigating regulations. Regulations of this sort are instanced by restrictions on the use of mortgage prepayment penalties in the 1994 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act.
Proposition 3.2 implies that regulators could achieve e¢ciency (in our model) by mandating favorable terms; but courts and regulators seem much more prone to prohibit unfavorable terms for at least two reasons. First, legal doctrine allows courts to replace unconscionable terms; whereas, mandating favorable terms may con ‡ict with the doctrine that courts should intervene minimally. 16 Second, identifying e¢cient terms may be unduly demanding for courts and regulators.
In this part, we consider the ex ante e¤ects of regulations which prohibit unfavorable contracts. Speci…cally, we model a regulated market as a game in which the monopolist can o¤er a simple contract or a complex contract containing either favorable or default terms. Aside from this amendment, the game corresponds to that de…ned in Section 2. We call it a mitigating regulation game.
Despite the formal similarity between unregulated and mitigating regulation games, equilibrium play di¤ers in one important respect. An unregulated monopolist would never o¤er default terms in a complex contract because she would earn more by o¤ering an unfavorable contract were buyers to reject after reading default terms, and would otherwise earn more by o¤ering a simple contract (cf. the proof of Lemma 2a). This argument does not apply if the monopolist is prohibited from o¤ering unfavorable contracts. As the monopolist is better o¤ with default terms when buyers accept without reading, there may then be equilibria in which she o¤ers a complex contract with default terms (a default contract) and charges more than   .
This di¤erence aside, we can exploit our analysis in Section 3.1 to characterize trade when the monopolist cannot o¤er unfavorable contracts. Speci…cally, in any semi-favorable BPE, the monopolist must o¤er favorable contracts with probability  and default contracts otherwise, charging
] and ´q1 ¡ 4   ¡  ; while buyers must accept with probability
. As     in any semi-favorable BPE, the only pertinent deviation for the monopolist is to o¤ering a simple contract, which yields the same pro…t as in unregulated markets. Consequently, the arguments used to prove Proposition 3.1 apply to this subsection's model; and the conditions therein hold again, subject 16 cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §208 Comment g and §211(3).
to replacing  ´0 [resp.   ] with    0 [resp.   ], and replacing unfavorable with default terms in any complex contract. (The probability that buyers read in a semi-favorable equilibrium now depends on   plus the drafting cost.) Speci…cally:
Lemma 4 Generic mitigating regulation games have a unique outcome. Buyers expect to earn 0 at this outcome, which is ine¢cient. The monopolist mixes between o¤ering a default and a favorable contract, each priced at  +´  +
2 1¡
, if and only if
. The monopolist otherwise o¤ers a simple contract, priced at   .
We omit the proof of Lemma 4 because it follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition 3.1.
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Mitigating regulation a¤ects the existence of a semi-favorable equilibrium via buyers' incentives to read and via the monopolist's incentives to o¤er a default contract; and the welfare e¤ects of mitigating regulation depend on whether a regulated and an unregulated monopolist each o¤er favorable contracts in equilibrium. Mitigating regulation would reduce pro…ts and welfare if an unregulated monopolist o¤ered an unfavorable contract for sure (so this contract would have to be second best) and 2    ¡   , as a regulated monopolist would then o¤er a simple contract.
Our main result in this part demonstrates that mitigating regulation can reduce welfare, via its e¤ect on buyer incentives, when the unregulated game has a semi-favorable equilibrium:
Proposition 3.3 (Mitigating regulation may reduce ex ante welfare) If
then the outcome in unregulated games Pareto dominates the outcome in mitigating regulation games.
Proof The lower bound on   in the premise implies that an unregulated monopolist o¤ers a favorable contract with positive probability, earning more than   ¡   (cf. Proposition 3.1). The upper bound on   implies that  is unde…ned; so a regulated monopolist o¤ers a simple contract, earning   ¡   (cf. Lemma 4). Buyers expect to earn 0 in both regulated and unregulated markets, proving the result.¥ Unlike regulations which mandate favorable terms, mitigating regulations do not eliminate the monopolist's commitment problem: she now has an incentive to o¤er default terms in the hope that buyers will accept without reading. In particular, the monopolist only o¤ers complex contracts in equilibrium if buyers have an incentive to read. For a …xed reading cost, this incentive is generated by the utility di¤erence between the best and the worst terms that a complex contract might contain in equilibrium. Mitigating regulation reduces this utility di¤erence. Consequently, the introduction of such regulations could force the monopolist to o¤er simple contracts. We exploit this e¤ect in Proposition 3.3.
Proposition 3.3 states that mitigating regulation can reduce ex ante welfare. However, if default terms are second best then A2 implies that replacing unfavorable terms in accepted contracts with default or favorable terms always increases welfare. 18 This di¤erence between ex ante and ex post welfare e¤ects restates why Proposition 3.3 seems so striking: regulations which raise welfare in court reduce welfare ex ante. The intuition is that the monopolist responds to regulations which prohibit unfavorable contracts by also no longer o¤ering favorable contracts.
While mitigating regulation reduces buyers' incentives to read, it also reduces the monopolist's incentives to deviate from a putative semi-favorable equilibrium: on the one hand, the regulated monopolist earns more than her unregulated counterpart in putative semi-favorable equilibria (because b    + ); on the other hand, mitigating regulation may reduce the pro…t earned by deviating to a second best contract. The monopolist would o¤er complex contracts, whether regulated or unregulated, if the conditions in Proposition 3.3 were replaced by    maxf4
The outcome in the mitigating regulation game then Pareto dominates that in an unregulated game: for    if both are wellde…ned, which implies that b    + ; so mitigating regulation then increases pro…t without a¤ecting buyer payo¤s.
It is instructive to consider a particular policy application of our results. Engel and McCoy (2002) argue that subprime lenders had monopoly power, which they exploited to include unfavorable terms in complex mortgage contracts. Engel and McCoy argue in favor of mitigating regulations, such as waiving legal redress. Our results suggest that this regulation may reduce welfare by driving all complex contracts, including favorable ones, from the market. 19 In the next section, we will argue that the deleterious e¤ects of mitigating regulation may be reinforced if some buyers are naively optimistic. This supposition seems appropriate in the market for subprime mortgages as Bucks and Pence (2008) show that mortgage borrowers held systematically optimistic beliefs about the terms in their adjustable rate mortgages. 
Naive buyers
Thus far, we have focused on play when buyers are sophisticated. Court decisions and the legal literature suggest that standard form contracts should be regulated in order to protect naive buyers. 21 In this section, we follow the recent literature by considering the e¤ects of regulation when some buyers naively believe that all complex contracts are favorable. Speci…cally, we suppose that the monopolist knows the proportion of naive 18 By contrast, mandating favorable terms raises welfare both ex ante and ex post. 19 J. Stevens articulated this justi…cation for Chapter 13 rules when concurring in Nobleman v. American Savings Bank 508 U. S. 324 (1993) . 20 Armstrong and Vickers (2012) argue that UK consumers have been (on average) naively optimistic about overdraft charges.
21 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §211(c) states that a clause is unenforceable if a buyer would not have traded had he known its contents. buyers (henceforth ) but cannot identify (and therefore directly target) them. In light of the heterogeneity of buyers, we further amend the model by supposing that the monopolist can o¤er a menu of contracts.
Naive buyers hold beliefs which are sometimes false; so we model them as dummy players. Speci…cally, we compute naive buyers' perceived utility for any menu of contracts, and assume that they each choose best responses, given their beliefs. In particular, naive buyers never read, and only accept the cheapest simple or the cheapest complex contract on o¤er. If the cheapest simple and complex contracts are respectively priced at   and   then naively optimistic buyers only accept the former if   ·   + minf  ¡    0g, and only accept the latter if
We refer to the other buyers as sophisticated. These buyers select one of the contracts on o¤er, which they then accept, reject or read. If the monopolist o¤ers more than one contract then sophisticated buyers' beliefs about the terms in each complex contract on o¤er may depend on the entire menu, rather than just on the price of that complex contract. (We will exploit this feature below.) Naive buyers value a complex contract at least as highly as sophisticated buyers. Consequently, naive and sophisticated buyers cannot respectively accept a simple and a complex contract in any BPE. Furthermore, there cannot be a BPE in which simple contracts are traded at di¤erent prices, as no buyer would accept the more expensive of two contracts; and there cannot be a BPE in which simple contracts alone are traded, as the monopolist could pro…tably deviate to o¤ering an unfavorable contract which attracts naive buyers. Finally, arguments used in the proof of Proposition 3.1 imply that sophisticated buyers who accept a favorable contract must again mix between accepting and reading it: which is again only possible in a BPE if  ¸4 .
For current purposes, we need to use the weaker re…nement of an -equilibrium, which we introduced in Section 2, focusing of course on play when  is small enough. We use an online appendix to explain why unregulated games lack an equilibrium, as well as other unproven claims in this section.
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If all buyers are naive then an unregulated monopolist o¤ers an unfavorable contract, priced at   , in every BPE, and therefore every -equilibrium. The monopolist o¤ers a favorable contract, priced at   under mandating regulation, and a default contract priced at   under mitigating regulation. Hence, both regulations bene…t the naive buyers at the expense of the monopolist. Mandating regulation always raises welfare, whereas mitigating regulation raises welfare if and only if default terms are second best.
The analysis of games in which  2 (0 1) is more subtle because the monopolist can use her menu to screen buyers. We focus on games in which few enough buyers are naive, exploring when and how the naive buyers may be protected by their sophisticated counterparts in unregulated markets, and how regulation a¤ects such protection.
We will adopt the following assumption -which imposes nontrivial restrictions on the model's parameters -throughout this section: A3 a Default terms are second best;
As    4, A3c can only also be satis…ed if  is small enough;    4 and A3c also imply that the right-hand side of the inequality in A3d is positive. The …rst two inequalities in A3b imply that the conditions in the premise of Proposition 3.1 are satis…ed: the equilibrium of an unregulated game with no naive buyers is semi-favorable.
A3 implies that an unregulated monopolist o¤ers complex contracts priced at  and at  (where 0      b ), earning less than
the supremum across BPEs of the monopolist's payo¤, in any -equilibrium. The cheaper contract is unfavorable, and is accepted by naive buyers. The other contract is unfavorable with probability , and is otherwise favorable, and is only accepted by sophisticated buyers. Naive buyers' payo¤ is negative because they pay a positive price for an unfavorable contract. (See Claim in the online appendix.) The predicted separation is consistent with Schwarcz's (2011) evidence of segmentation in the market for home insurance. While naive and sophisticated buyers accept di¤erent contracts, sophisticated buyers protect naive buyers in these -equilibria. Speci…cally, naive buyers would be prepared to pay up to   for complex contracts; but the monopolist charges them less because she also wants to o¤er complex contracts to sophisticated buyers, who would reject complex contracts priced above b . The monopolist must therefore charge naive buyers less than she charges sophisticated buyers. Sophisticated buyers also protect (few enough) naive buyers in Schwartz and Wilde (1983) and the ensuing literature. However, the e¤ect occurs there because sellers cannot o¤er a menu of contracts which screens buyers. 23 We now turn to the e¤ect of regulation on markets which contain naive buyers. Under mandating regulation, the monopolist o¤ers a favorable contract, priced at   , resulting in e¢cient trade. A3 implies that the regulated monopolist's pro…t exceeds  ¤ : the upper bound on her pro…ts when unregulated. Naive buyers also bene…t from mandating regulation because they then earn 0. These observations extend Proposition 3.2 (no naive buyers). Now suppose that the monopolist is prohibited from o¤ering unfavorable contracts. The monopolist then o¤ers a simple contract priced at   and a default contract priced at   , which sophisticated and naive buyers respectively accept in every BPE: for    4 +   (in A3b) implies that  is unde…ned, so sophisticated buyers cannot accept a complex contract.
Naive buyers earn   ¡   in every -equilibrium of the mitigating regulation game, and earn more than ¡b  in every -equilibrium of the unregulated game because   b . A3b implies that    , and therefore that   ¡    ¡b ; so mitigating regulation harms naive buyers. In particular, naive buyers pay a higher price for a complex contract with better terms in a regulated market. A3 implies that the former e¤ect dominates: few enough naive buyers are harmed because sophisticated buyers no longer protect them under mitigating regulation. By contrast, mitigating regulation bene…ts buyers if they are all naive. Now consider the menu which a regulated monopolist o¤ers in equilibrium. Sophisticated [resp. naive] buyers would also have accepted a simple [resp. default] contract priced at   [resp.   ] in an unregulated market; so mitigating regulation must harm the monopolist. Finally, sophisticated buyers expect to earn about 0 in every -equilibrium, irrespective of the legal regime. Consequently, mitigating regulation must reduce welfare, even though default terms are second best (so this regulation would raise welfare when all buyers are naive).
We summarize these arguments in:
Proposition 4.1 (The e¤ect of regulation with naive buyers) If A3 then a Trade under mandating regulation is e¢cient. Mandating regulation bene…ts the monopolist and naive buyers.
b Mitigating regulation harms naive buyers and the monopolist, and reduces welfare.
Conclusion
We have analyzed the e¤ect of regulations in a simple model of trade between a monopolist and sophisticated buyers. Mandating favorable terms unsurprisingly induces e¢cient trade. However, identifying e¢cient terms may be more di¢cult for courts or regulators than identifying terms which are manifestly ine¢cient. We show that an unregulated monopolist may o¤er a contract containing the latter terms; so mitigating regulation may a¤ect trade. Our main results demonstrate that this e¤ect may reduce welfare. We have extended our main model to incorporate naive buyers, demonstrating that our results carry over to such settings. Indeed, the presence of naive buyers could reinforce the (potentially) deleterious e¤ects of mitigating regulation by removing the protection that sophisticated buyers provide in an unregulated monopoly.
APPENDIX (PROOFS)
Proof a Suppose, per contra, that the monopolist o¤ered f g. There are two cases to consider. If a buyer would reject after reading f g then he would also reject after reading f g, so the monopolist would be indi¤erent between the two contracts in the event that the buyer read. As the buyer accepts with positive probability, the monopolist would prefer to o¤er f g. Now suppose that a buyer would accept with positive probability after reading f g. The price could then not exceed   , in which case the monopolist could economize on the drafting cost by o¤ering a simple contract, priced at . In sum, the monopolist cannot o¤er a default contract in any BPE.
b A2 implies that the monopolist can earn positive pro…ts by o¤ering a second best contract. Consequently, buyers must accept any complex contract that the monopolist o¤ers with positive probability (possibly after reading) in any BPE.
Suppose that the monopolist o¤ers a favorable contract in a BPE. If buyers never read then the monopolist could pro…tably deviate to o¤ering an unfavorable contract at the same price. A buyer who reads must accept a favorable contract and reject a contract which contains some other terms, else he could pro…tably deviate to not reading. Finally, buyers must sometimes accept without reading: for A2 would otherwise imply that the monopolist would o¤er a favorable contract for sure, in which case buyers could pro…tably deviate to not reading, as they could infer terms from the price. Hence, a monopolist who o¤ers a favorable contract, priced at , must o¤er another complex contract priced at  with positive probability. Part a above implies that this contract must be unfavorable.¥
Proposition 3.1 (Unregulated games)
The monopolist otherwise o¤ers a second best contract, priced at  2 . Proof Lemma 1 immediately implies that every equilibrium must be ine¢cient. We will prove the other claims in the Proposition using the following steps. We start by proving existence of and characterizing second best BPEs, arguing that every BPE is either second best or semi-favorable. We then prove existence of a semi-favorable BPE in which the monopolist charges b  if and only if the conditions in the premise hold. We end the proof by applying our re…nement to the set of BPEs.
Step 1 The second best BPE outcome The following strategy combination and beliefs form a BPE.
The monopolist o¤ers a second best contract, priced at  2 . Buyers accept a simple [resp. complex] contract priced no higher than   [resp. 0], believing that any complex contract is unfavorable. After reading a complex contract which contains terms  and is priced at , buyers accept if and only if  ¸ .
A2 implies that the monopolist cannot pro…tably deviate to o¤ering either any other complex contract or any simple contract at another price. Buyers' beliefs are sequentially rational.
Lemma 2 implies that the monopolist must o¤er the unfavorable contract for sure in any complex BPE which is not semi-favorable. The monopolist must o¤er the second best contract, priced at  2 , in any BPE which is not semi-favorable, as she could otherwise pro…tably deviate to o¤ering that contract.
Buyer beliefs about the terms in complex contracts may di¤er across second best BPEs; but generic games (where   ¡  6 = ¡  ) have a unique second best BPE outcome, in which buyers earn 0.
Step 2 Semi-favorable BPE outcomes Suppose that    4 and (1). We claim that the following strategy combination and beliefs form a semi-favorable BPE:
The monopolist o¤ers fb   g with probability , and otherwise o¤ers fb  g. After reading contract f g, buyers accept if and only if  ¸ . Buyers believe that a complex contract priced at b  is favorable with probability
, and is otherwise unfavorable. They accept a complex contract priced at b  with probability
and read otherwise, accepting if and only if the terms are favorable. Buyers believe that any complex contract priced at  6 = b  is unfavorable. They accept such a contract without reading if  · 0, and otherwise reject. Buyers accept a simple contract if and only if its price does not exceed   .
   4 implies that  and b  are well-de…ned. Note, for future reference, that (1) also implies that b     : so buyers cannot pro…tably deviate to accepting a default contract, priced at b  after reading. Conditional on their beliefs, buyers can therefore not pro…tably deviate.
Given buyer strategies, the monopolist earns b  ¡   if she o¤ers either fb   g or fb  g, and cannot pro…tably deviate to o¤ering fb  g. By de…nition of  , 1+ 2 2 (0 1). As b     , the monopolist cannot pro…tably deviate to o¤ering a contract which buyers would reject.
Buyers accept complex contracts priced at  6 = b  if and only if  · 0; so the monopolist would earn no more than ¡  by o¤ering a complex contract which buyers accept. Furthermore, the monopolist would earn no more than   ¡   by o¤ering a simple contract. Consequently, the monopolist cannot pro…tably deviate to o¤ering an accepted contract if and only if
Substituting for b  and rearranging: (1) and (2) are equivalent. In sum, the monopolist cannot pro…tably deviate; so the speci…ed strategy combination and beliefs form a BPE.
Inspection of the arguments above reveals that, if (2) holds, then there are also semifavorable BPEs in which the monopolist o¤ers f g with probability  and f  g otherwise, for some  2 (   b ). The monopolist earns ¡  in any such BPE. Consequently, such BPEs only exist if there is a semi-favorable BPE in which the monopolist charges b , and the monopolist earns most in the BPE where she charges b . We now argue that    4 and (1) are necessary for a semi-favorable BPE to exist. Lemma 2 implies that, in any semi-favorable BPE: the monopolist o¤ers f  g with probability (say)  and f g otherwise, and that buyers mix between accepting and reading a complex contract priced at . Buyers can only be indi¤erent between accepting and reading if  =  1¡
, in which case they prefer not to reject if and only if    2 ¡    +  · 0. This condition is only consistent with  2 (0 1) if    4. Next, observe that the monopolist earns  ¡   in any semi-favorable BPE where she charges . As  =  1¡ and buyers cannot prefer to reject in any semi-favorable BPE, the monopolist cannot earn more than b  ¡   in any such BPE. The monopolist would earn up to  2 ¡  2 by o¤ering the second best contract in any BPE. As (1) and (2) are equivalent, the monopolist could pro…tably deviate to o¤ering a second best contract if (1) failed.
Step 3 Selecting equilibrium outcomes We now consider which BPEs satisfy our re…nement. Suppose, …rst, that    4 and (1) holds. The monopolist is then better o¤ in the BPEs where she charges b  than in any other semi-favorable BPE, and than in the second best BPEs (by (2)). This allows us to de…ne the -commitment type (for  small enough) in perturbed games ( ) as a monopolist who o¤ers fb    g with probability b   and fb     g otherwise: where b  ´b  ¡  and 0    b  ¡   ¡ ( 2 ¡  2 ): so the monopolist charges b   in a semi-favorable BPE of the original game, . We …rst demonstrate that ( ) has no BPE in which the monopolist o¤ers a second best contract:
Buyers and the (normal type of) monopolist respectively earn 0 and  2 ¡ 2 in any second best BPE; so buyers would not reject a complex contract priced at b    b . Accordingly, suppose that the normal type deviated to o¤ering fb     g. Buyers would accept, possibly after reading, and the monopolist would earn b   ¡   . This deviation is pro…table because b   ¡     2 ¡  2 . Hence, no BPE of ( ) prescribes the normal type to o¤er a second best contract when  is small enough; so  does not have a second best equilibrium.
We now argue that  has a semi-favorable equilibrium. Consider a strategy combination in ( ) where the normal and the -commitment type pool: both o¤ering contracts priced at b   . The normal type cannot pro…tably deviate to o¤ering either a simple contract or a complex contract priced at  6 = b   if buyers believe that such a contract is unfavorable. Arguments used in Step 2 above also imply that buyers cannot pro…tably deviate. Consequently, ( ) has a BPE in which the monopolist mixes between o¤ering fb     g and fb    g. Taking limits as  and  each approach 0 (and therefore as b   ! b ),  has a semi-favorable equilibrium in which the monopolist charges b . If    4 or (1) fails then every BPE is second best. Accordingly, the monopolist's -commitment type in ( ) o¤ers a second best contract, priced at  2 . By construction, the -commitment type o¤ers the same contract in ( ) as the monopolist o¤ers in the second best BPE in . Buyers may then infer (in ( )) that any complex contract that the monopolist o¤ers is unfavorable. The monopolist then has no pro…table deviation in ( ) from o¤ering a second best contract priced at  2 ; and buyers cannot pro…tably deviate (cf.
Step 1). Consequently, this is the only outcome in .¥
